Harris' final chapters

I think a great deal of Harris' book hinges on the idea that one should give little merit or consideration to processes because they are "natural". Which, as I've stated, is not necessarily the whole story. (Human) Morality is specific to humans, and not does not apply to the entire planet or the rules of nature, so you can't say a natural process is either moral or immoral (First parenthesis added because great apes have similar, but different cultural morality). One doesn't say that a wolf murdered another wolf, because "Murder" is an emotionally weighted term and the wolf doesn't know (our) right from wrong. As I once wrote in a paper "[Nature] is a neutral statistician." The fact that this conversation is even taking place is evident of this; The rules of morality are negotiable and do not represent the "Laws of Nature". Those who don't are not arguing by emotional virtue to preserve nature may simply be calling for great caution when disrupting such a complicated and inter-woven system.

He is likely tying the tendency to err with nature, in his mind, to religious appreciation of "God's masterpiece" or at least to that secular feeling of the Numinous. I will say that I am definitely affected by this feeling when climbing a mountain or overlooking a lovely forest, but at the same time I know that humans cannot live by nature's rules alone. Hell, I am a web developer; I couldn't even feed myself without technology. So it is definitely possible to appreciate both the natural and the technological and weigh their merits equally. In fact, as indicated with the rise of green energy, it's probably essential. Why reinvent a bumpy wheel instead of sand it down?

I largely dismissed Kass's arguments because they were easily shot down. Even Harris was able to do it pretty handily. Habermas, on the other hand, had some good, complex points, however culturally influenced (I'm not sure that a person's will is as powerful as the Germans seem to believe. See WWI). It reveals a nuanced aspect of individual suffering vs public benefit. Habermas points out that the potential for the actions of unwise parents to inflict completely, thoroughly irreversible harm is risen ten-fold if you empower them to alter the genetics of their children (Germans are also wary of any claim that certain genes are better than others and should be selected for, for pretty obvious reasons). While it is true that any number of parental decisions can put their children in this position, genetic manipulation IS completely irreversibly, while one could conceivably work one's way out of health or economic problems. So, a child could potentially be existentially or physically harmed to an atrocious extend. BUT most parents will probably (debate-ably) make decent, if not good, decisions concerning the genetic future of their children. These interventions won't come cheap, and parents will probably only resort to them if they are avoiding a terrible disease or providing some great benefit. So, most altered children may benefit greatly from their parents' ability to alter them while a minority may suffer in equal scores. The underlying question here: Is suffering a greater priority than benefit? If the answer is yes, Is there a point where the suffering minority becomes inconsequential? Let's say only 10 children were to suffer as opposed to 20,000 children being altered to avoid their parents' chemical depression? Would this be worth it? 

As a final point, I think genetic alteration may be necessary to continue evolution and is probably the price we pay for every individual getting to mate, whether or not their genes are fit. (It's debatable that my genes would be fit in the strictest sense and I still eagerly await the day my first child is born.) But a true extension of evolution would be alterations only for the sake of adaptions. For example, if the sun begins to cool in the distant future, maybe we ought to be altered to be able to withstand cold or be more suited for space travel.